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The most important role of governments in the world today is to deal with the 
state of their national economies.  Of the 200 or so countries in the world, perhaps half 
are in some form of serious economic dilemma, and most of the rest face major 
challenges to keep their economies up with burgeoning demands on them.  After the fall 
of the U.S.S.R., the 15 nations that emerged from it and the countries of the former 
Soviet bloc in eastern Europe are all struggling to abandon their Soviet style governments 
and economies and accommodate to a “market tested economy” that few of them really 
understand.  Most of the nations of Sub Saharan Africa have economies that are so weak 
that they are scarcely able to support even basic public services, especially when the 
country is in the hands of tyrannical and incompetent governments mired in wars, 
rebellions and the incursions of terrorist war lords.  In the Far East, state socialist 
governments are also being forced to abandon much of their socialist economies and 
retreat slowly and reluctantly into some form of market economy.  The countries of the 
Middle East deteriorate because of armed conflicts.  Unfortunately, these realities come 
at a time when the more developed countries of the world are evolving into a complex 
new “globalization” world which widens the gap over the struggling less developed 
economies. 
A large part of this greater complexity and sophistication relates to the ability to 
absorb new technologies, and to shift the economy of a country away from low value 
economic activities to those that produce a higher rate of wealth generation.  Economies 
can be characterized as falling into the following groupings: 
1. Primary economic level consisting mainly of agriculture, forestry, fishing, 
crafts, cottage industries, and much of the informal economy. 
2. Secondary level involving mining, primary metals creation and fabrication, 
processing of metals, soft goods, manufacturing production and assembly operations, 
construction, chemicals processing, and machinery fabrication. 
3. Tertiary level  featuring provision of utility services (gas, electricity, water), 
finance and banking, real estate, communications, transportation, distribution and 
wholesaling, health care, social services, education, retailing, information management, 
cleaning maintenance and disposal, sports, culture, recreation and government. 
There seems to be a natural trend of movement of economies from the primary 
level up the scale of economic development.  In addition, many governments are 
pursuing deliberate strategies to move into the secondary or tertiary levels because these 
economic activities are far more wealth creating and “value added”.   The United States is 
among the most advanced in moving heavily into tertiary levels, and leaders in countries 
such as Japan and S. Korea for example, are now perceiving that their current policy of 
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encouraging manufacturing is perhaps incomplete and needs to be modified to push their 
economies into tertiary levels of activity.  Also, one of the consequences of this 
movement is that moving up the scale requires a higher degree of education and technical 
training, and the capacity to advance is highly influenced by the quality of education in 
the country and the ability of large numbers of people to adapt to more sophisticated 
work environments than usually found in structured manufacturing work.  Economic 
success now rests more on answering the question “What does the world want?”, and less 
on the issue of “What do we have to sell?”  Over -reliance on natural resources and cheap 
labor produces marginal economies.  Protectionism of domestic economies is 
increasingly seen as costly and inefficient in world terms. 
It is not easy for government leaders, especially in former state socialist countries 
to understand these powerful economic trends.  In many cases, when national leaders are 
forced to face up to poor results, they tend to stick to the same policies but resolve to “try 
harder”.  Thus, one of the initial responses of the Chinese government to poor performing 
state owned enterprises (SOE) was to develop a program of management “contracts” with 
SOE managers involving performance goals and targets.  But of course, the Party 
continued to interfere in matters of SOE operations and such contracts were essentially 
meaningless. 
The Emergence of the “Semi-Socialist” State 
Just as there is no such thing as a single clear definition of a “democratic” state, 
there has never been a single model or pattern for the socialist state.  With the decline of 
economic socialism, several dozen countries in all parts of the world are struggling to 
define how their governments must be reformed and redirected over the next 2 to 3 
decades.  Each approach is different because, while they all reflect their socialist past, 
each differs in their history, culture, national motivations and ambitions, the state of 
economic development, and the differing nature of their previous regimes.  All are 
experimenting, and there is a high degree of uncertainty about how to proceed or what the 
outcomes will be.  All however seem to share certain common characteristics.  First, all 
are retreating from a socialist past.  Some are retreating slowly and reluctantly.  Others 
are pushing - somewhere - as fast as possible.  In most cases, the retreat is being directed 
by many of the same people who directed the governments they are now forced to 
change.  A new generation of leaders is slowly emerging, but until they do, the older 
generation will move slowly. They are reluctant to abandon old strongly held 
commitments, and most are very reluctant to abandon such massive power. 
The most striking shared characteristic is the reluctant recognition that economic 
socialism is a failure, and that somehow, the combination of centrist government policy 
and financial controls and the operational performance of state owned enterprises proved 
to be inferior to a market based economy extensively freed from various forms of 
government controls.1 This is an excruciatingly painful admission for dedicated socialist 
leaders to make.  Socialist government philosophies are still strong, and inertia is very 
great.  Thus, most socialist governments seek to retreat as slowly as possible from 
economic socialism, hoping for some form of reprieve, and stopping or delaying action 
whenever it is possible. Many countries seek to retain as much of the “social socialism” 
commitments as possible, and retain the philosophy of deep involvement of governments 
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in social well-being. Most importantly, governments seek to retain socialist political 
power and control of the government, or at least a strong socialist political party in the 
country. 
What is emerging are several dozen nations seeking new ways to combine a 
retained socialist political dominance with some degree of movement of the economy 
into market based patterns,2  which can be called the “semi-socialist” state.  But such a 
“semi-socialist” state is viewed with skepticism by purists at both ends of the political 
and economic spectrum.  The pure socialist intellectuals see this as betrayal and apostasy.  
The pure free marketers see it as infeasible, inadequate in scope, and ultimately 
unworkable.  The advocates of democratic governance see it at best as a transitional 
course in which centrist socialism will inevitably give way to the will of the people.  But 
the hope and expectation in these several dozen governments is that, by experimentation 
or muddling through, they will find a middle ground that proves to be stable and 
successful.  Even supposedly representative democracies too are rather muddled 
combinations of market economies and heavy government involvement in the provision 
of social services.  In this sense, all governments in the near future may well be “semi-
socialist” states. 
While the experiments with the semi socialist state are as different as the 
countries pursuing them, several general models can be described which might help to 
understand what approaches are being tried.   
1.  The “western” model 
Patterned broadly after governments in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the basic approach is to relinquish direct 
economic development and operations almost entirely to the private sector, with 
governments confined to certain imperatives such as broad fiscal and monetary policy, 
the operations of a central bank, and some oversight over private sector practices.  In this 
model, most of the state owned enterprises are being sold off to the private sector, 
government controls over the economy are being reduced, and the government is 
concentrating its energy and resources on vital social programs and public infrastructure.  
Control over the private sector is primarily exercised through the tax system and the 
courts, and through public health and safety regulations. 
2.  The Chinese Model 
In the People’s Republic of China, what may be called the “Chinese model” 
involves the socialist/communist political leadership remaining firmly in control, but with 
a rapid opening up of the economy and greater latitude for private sector investment and 
the guarded privatization or “commercialization” of state owned enterprises.  The key 
policy is to retain a very high level of political control over the economy, responsibility 
for social services, and control of society in general.  While there is now a more extensive 
and vigorous market based economic sector, the government still maintains a very 
extensive range of SOEs, with control of the most important of them in the hands of the 
national government, but the remainder delegated to provincial governors and municipal 
mayors.  Even while privatizing most of its banks, the central government maintains 
control over critical elements of banking and investment including the four largest 
commercial banks, along with the “commanding heights” industries.  There continues to 
be heavy state regulation of economic affairs, public policies directing the affairs of local 
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governments, almost compete ownership of land, and an almost intact control over 
policies framing Chinese society along socialist lines. 
3.  The Indian model 
After a protracted effort at full blown state socialism, and excessive use of state 
owned enterprises, the Indian government now seems to be on a track which permits 
parallel economies -- one public and one private -- to be pursued more or less at will.  But 
the overall allocation of roles between the two sectors remains in the hands of the 
government, which shifts its views from regime to regime so that the evolution of these 
roles is a loose pragmatic one.  Social programs remain almost entirely the responsibility 
of government, with richer people able to buy some services such as education and health 
care from private sources.  Government social programs remain hopelessly inadequate. 
4.  The Bi-level model 
As typified by a country such as Turkey, this approach is a form of the 
“commanding heights” approach in that the government maintains a large public sector in 
which much of the larger elements of the economy are regarded as “commanding 
heights”, and the private sector is conceded primacy in small and intermediate sized 
businesses, the services sector, non-manufacturing industry, and the rest of the non-basic 
enterprises.  Like India, social services are necessarily a responsibility of the government 
and poorly done. 
5.  The Capital Investment model 
In some cases, the state is privatizing most of the economy; it may or may not 
keep certain “commanding heights” public enterprises, but its real efforts are 
concentrated on providing the funding for development of large capital intensive 
economic development risks which the private sector cannot or will not undertake, or 
which are seen as a national policy imperative which must be expedited. 
The essence for these retreating socialist governments is much the same as it is in 
all other countries:  how far must a government go in relinquishing centrist power -- both 
to corporations and to individuals -- in order to create a more effective and growing 
economy, versus how much real power can be retained in the government to control or 
modulate economic affairs.  The Chinese obviously see their future as remaining very 
strongly centrist and socialist and they do not see these ambitions as inconsistent.   It 
seems perfectly feasible for most forms of semi-socialist states to become economically 
successful.  But there is an important form of reality in this “socialism versus market 
economy” debate that still remains unclear.   Because of the fact that highly socialist and 
centrist regimes of the past have failed, the key question centers around how far the 
socialist retreat may have to go to reach economic viability, and is it so far that a real 
socialist regime ceases to have meaning?  Is there some watershed in economic evolution 
beyond which the socialist framework no longer survives?  China has now decided to 
move as swiftly as any nation in the world in opening up its economy, and abandoning 
both the theory and the regulatory practices that kept it sealed off from the outside.  Will 
the opening of market entrepreneurialism unleash such forces in the country that old 
regimes will be seen as obsolete or obstructionist, and be swept aside?  Will liberty in 
economic terms precipitate liberty in political terms?  These are the issues that haunt the 
Chinese leadership and the leadership in many other retreating socialist regimes. 
In order to put together more development capital for investment in its “new 
wave” market economy, the Chinese government has finally been forced to face up to the 
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inefficiencies of its state owned enterprises.  At first, in the 1980’s, the Chinese 
government sought to upgrade the performance of SOEs by pressing for better 
management, usually through the form of performance management contracts between 
the government and each enterprise.  This effort failed in large part because the motives 
for difficult upgrading did not exist, and in part because of the limits placed on SOEs by 
the government itself (e. g., no funds for new technology).  In another effort, the central 
government fobbed off many enterprises onto provincial and municipal governments and 
told them to cope.   
But now, fiscal and economic reality is closing in and forcing what the Chinese 
government has most dreaded --the closure of many SOEs that have not been able to 
respond to improvement efforts, and can no longer afford to carry millions of redundant 
workers on the payroll.  The Chinese government is notoriously unwilling to publish any 
reliable figures about its economy, but sources seem to indicate that an extraordinary 24 
million jobs have been lost in failed SOEs in the last 4-5 years.  Most were in the 
economic areas such as agricultural collectives, mines and primary manufacturing, 
including many of the very large manufacturing SOEs.  But despite these draconian 
reductions, still more cutbacks and closures appear necessary.  In banking for example, 
some 45,000 offices have been closed, and 250,000 people laid off.3  
The sheer magnitude of the reductions simply highlights the degree to which these 
enterprises were overstaffed in the first place.  Many of the workers who have been 
unemployed will receive a stipend for three years while they seek other employment: 
these workers are not counted as unemployed until the stipend is completed, but 
unemployed they are.  Millions will not succeed in finding new jobs in the private sector, 
and will have to be absorbed into the informal economy, thus increasing competition, and 
lowering incomes for all.  Others in rural areas can retreat back onto family farms, but 
this is the same marginal economic environment from which they fled to the cities in the 
first place.  In all, the government figures list 8 million workers officially unemployed, 
and an additional 6 million who are considered “between jobs, and seeking work”.    
Other estimates run considerably higher.  In addition, rural under-employment is 
estimated to be a staggering 150,000,000 workers, and there are an additional 
125,000,000 “floaters” in urban areas not counted in official employment figures. 4  
Chinese economic development policy faces an additional dilemma:  the kind of high 
tech economic organizations that they need to meet the standards of the international 
economy, are also the types of organizations that have least to offer in the way of creation 
of large numbers of jobs to help soak up all of that unemployment. 
Social Services Reforms 
The central theme of the Chinese government is the emergence of modern cities 
and their surrounding regions that are expected to become powerhouses for economic 
development and the provision of millions of new jobs to absorb the shift in population 
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from farms and rural areas.  In the short run, this has overwhelmed many cities, 
especially since they are facing the decline of SOEs. 
In Chinese cities, there are “entitled” workers and their families who are given 
priority access to subsidized housing, food, state-sector jobs with many fringe benefits 
including health care, disability pensions, unemployment compensation and other vital 
social services.  But there are millions of urban workers who are not “entitled” and who 
must fend for themselves. 5   This policy was a means of modulating the shift of 
populations from agricultural to manufacturing jobs, but in fact, individual workers have 
swarmed into cities in huge numbers in defiance of that policy.   The government 
officially discourages these people, but on the other hand, they constitute a reservoir of 
cheap workers who contribute to the urban economy without the added costs of the 
“entitlement” benefits, so they are largely tolerated.  In fact, this is a good example of the 
failures of governments to try and control urban growth.  The percentage of workers 
outside of agriculture rose to 43% by 1993.  Some of this floating population lived in 
near-by towns where they could commute to the cities daily for work, but most lived 
crowded into apartment slums. 
In general, the policy of the government was almost wholly concentrated on 
development of large scale manufacturing, most of it in SOEs.  It was anti-urban, in the 
sense that it tried to limit the growth of cities to the pace of industrial development.  
There has been little or no policy of rural development, but there has been an attempt to 
disaggregate SOE responsibility to townships, villages, and provincial governments.  
There is also an effort to divert militarily important facilities away from coastal areas into 
the interior.   
But despite these policies, the coastal cities had such economic advantages, 
including foreign direct investment, that they became rich at the expense of all others.  
City jurisdictions were expanded to include much of the surrounding territory, and new 
suburbs began to develop.  Also, many urban factories are subcontracting to suppliers and 
parts manufacturers in smaller towns and rural areas -- again, largely through the SOEs. 
Many of the floating population -- all of whom were supposed to be temporary -- 
became permanent, or semi-permanent, often returning to their villages during off periods 
of seasonal work.  Most are young, male, and with limited education.  Many of these 
floaters drifted into the informal economy, and make major contributions to the supply of 
consumer goods and services, which the formal economy neglects.  But they also 
overburden the official public infrastructure, which is justified and financed only to deal 
with the “official” population of the city -- a socialist planning mistake.  During the 20 
year period of enforced “Stalinist” industrialization, housing, consumer goods and 
services had been sacrificed for heavy industry.  Few stores were open, restaurants were 
scarce, long lists of goods were rationed, and housing was unbelievably crowded. 
In recent years, these mistakes have started to be corrected.  Investment in light 
industry has started (much through the disaggregated SOEs at the local government 
level), rules for creation of neighborhood collectives, cooperatives, and private ventures 
were liberalized, farmers are allowed to direct market in cities, etc.  This policy is 
working ---- but Chinese cities are about 50 years behind their Western contemporaries. 
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In effect, the economic policy continues to favor the heavy industry base, and 
consumerism and service sectors are “delegated” to lower governments, private 
enterprise, and the informal economy. 
Many social services supplied by governments are universal and often free.  The 
government has relied on heavily subsidized food supplies, elementary/secondary 
education, and low cost housing.  But other social services are still tied to SOEs -- health 
care, pensions, disability insurance, some vocational training.  Thus, in many places, only 
about 65% of the urban population really has access to these benefits.6  SOEs that are in a 
deficit situation (most of them) are hard put to live up to their commitments, and are 
trying to retrench or mandate co-payments.  Provinces and local governments are being 
forced to absorb these social responsibilities, but lack the stable funding base to do so. 
Many of the special rationing and food subsidies that are no longer justified are extremely 
hard to eliminate or even reduce. 
The state is realizing that “full employment” can no longer be promised in the 
state sector, and two trends are happening:  hope is being placed in the private sector, and 
a form of unemployment compensation is being installed.  Similarly, there is an attempt 
to shift old age pensions from the SOEs to a universal system administered by local 
government -- but without the funds to do so. 
Housing has improved vastly over the last 15 years.  Average space is increasing:   
from 3.6 square meters (6’ X 6’) to almost double that now.  Serious problems remain.  
The State has neglected maintenance and repair, and many units provided by the State are 
being fixed up by their occupants or by managing cooperatives, at their own expense. But 
over half of all housing continues to be under the SOEs or government bodies.  Rents are 
heavily subsidized, but the pattern is bad housing at low cost.  Proposals to “marketize” 
rents are under way, but stiffly resisted. 
The number one complaint of urban dwellers is the lack of consumer services 
including transport and child care, but also including small retail shops and the 
availability of consumer goods.  This is a direct consequence of long term government 
neglect and the prevention of private entrepreneurship.  But more latitude for private and 
“informal” enterprise is reducing the past failures of the market, and has begun to make 
up for the lack of public funds.  Cities and townships are leading a “bottom-up” effort to 
fill consumer needs, often through the creation of collectives which are enterprises 
controlled by their owners and managers. 
With the emphasis on heavy industrial development, several other problems were 
created.  Many jobs in other sectors were frozen, and there were few salary increases, 
shrinkage in the number of housing units, lack of consumer goods, rationing, and long 
lines.  Thus, the average citizen was “taxed” in more ways than one.  The urban destitute 
are denied a political voice because the leadership doesn’t want to hear the complaints, 
and can do little about them.  The “cradle to grave” commitment has not meant much 
except to those in the favored sectors of the economy; and as State resources have 
withered, things have only gotten worse.   New neighborhood-run collective enterprises, 
urban private enterprises, and rural subcontracting are the most dynamic part of the 
economy.  
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The Example of Chinese Health Care 
China, much more quickly than the Soviet Union, recognized the urgency of 
major movement of the economy into the competitive market based economy, and it 
began the process as early as the 1980s, with remarkable results.  China has been growing 
its economy an average of 9.7% over the last 20 years.  But this pattern of total economic 
growth has been offset by a number of adverse consequences in the social services 
arenas.  First, as in the Soviet Union, much of the provision of social services was 
mandated on the state owned enterprises.  Each was supposedly responsible for such 
things as health care, pensions, and even education for their workers, and by default to 
much of the communities in which they operated.   
Thus, as China has moved to divest these SOEs, the burden of social services was 
supposed to be taken up by local governments.  At the same time, in order to reduce the 
costs financed by the national government, the Chinese central government, again like the 
Soviets, dumped social services programs on municipalities, townships, and provinces.  
But this was accompanied by drastic reductions in the levels of funding provided by the 
national government.  As a consequence, local governments inherited huge new 
responsibilities without the funds to carry them out.  The central government happily 
concluded that it had cleaned up its budget on the assumption that local governments 
would somehow make up the difference. But most of China’s townships and counties are 
broke and many cities and provinces are not much better off.  As a result, the substitution 
of local funding for national funding has simply not taken place. At the same time, the 
central government was also purging the central budget of the huge losses run up by these 
SOEs, believing that the combination of the newly created private sector and revitalized 
SOEs remaining under government control would generate new wealth that could be 
tapped in the form of government taxes.  But most of the private sector, recognizing the 
lack of legal and enforcement powers of the government, has managed to avoid providing 
health insurance at all.  National financing of health care fell from more than 60% of total 
health care spending to less than 40%.  
These catastrophic declines in health care funds come on top of a national health 
care system that was wholly inadequate to begin with.  Paralleling the Soviet pattern, 
health care had been marginal in cities and almost non-existent in rural and village areas.  
The old pattern of subsidized clinics around the country has collapsed to the extent that 
perhaps 90% of the rural population has little or no access to health care, and even the 
cities are fortunate to be able to meet 60% of their demands.  There continue to be big 
gaps between the provision of social services in the new economic development regions 
of the country and the rural hinterlands.  Even more serious is the fact that, even where 
health care is available it is so relatively expensive that most poor people simply cannot 
afford it.  A recent government survey found that 60% of the rural population says that 
they no longer feel that they can use the hospitals that are available.  As a consequence, 
the true “cost” of the collapsed health care system is measured by the inability of people 
to get it.  Diseases that had been all but eliminated such as small pox and tuberculosis are 
now apparently on the increase.  And this collapsed system is facing an ominous new 
challenge in the form of the spread of HIV/AIDS, with an estimated 1 million victims 
now, and the prospect that this number will increase ten fold in the next 5-10 years.   
The government was shaken out of its preoccupation with economic development 
by the panic created by the outbreak of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 
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2003.  This panic brought home not only how totally inadequate the health care system is, 
but a greater sense of what enormous efforts will be needed to modernize and expand it to 
some acceptable level, and how extraordinarily difficult it will be to find the funds to 
undertake modernization.  There is an urgent need for one or more systems of health care 
insurance.  Even moderately well off people lack an adequate reserve of savings to meet 
even a moderate medical crisis, and there is some evidence that the very high rate of 
savings by Chinese is in part a reflection of the need to build up family financial reserves 
against an uncertain medical future.  Local governments are often unwilling or unable to 
make the necessary contributions, especially in poorer regions.  And individuals are often 
unwilling to pay for a service that they feel they may not immediately need.  For the past 
two decades, local governments have gouged farmers for contributions to an almost non-
existent health care system, with the money being used mostly to pay staffs (many 
surplus to requirements or simply non-existent), with the money being used to line 
officials’ pockets, rather than to pay for services.  Consequently, there is reluctance to 
join any new scheme.   
The government is pinning a lot of hopes on the greater involvement of private 
sector investors, and many townships or cities are trying to sell off their hospitals to 
private investors.  But such investors fear the extent of continued government 
involvement (most hospitals are still owned and overseen by governments), nor are they 
sure whether a reasonable profit can be earned except in the richest areas of the new 
Chinese economy.  Therefore, shifting costs to the private sector will remain a slow and 
tricky process. Privatization has meant many improvements in services, and greater 
investment in equipment and training, but again, these hospitals are in wealthy parts of 
the country, and they are unlikely to lower costs very much elsewhere.  The government 
policy thus seems to be to rely on an uncertain set of expectations for the private sector, 
meanwhile concentrating declining public funds on a smaller number of facilities.  But it 
is clear that, for a very long time, governments at some level will have to provide health 
care for the masses of the rural and urban poor, and there is no private sector “out” in 
meeting that need. 
Dealing with Centrist Governments 
Looking at the enormous power exercised by totalitarian regimes, there is a 
tendency to feel powerless and hopeless, and to believe that no power can unseat them. 
This is especially true when the ultimate pathology has occurred and a tyrant has 
succeeded in perverting the governing laws themselves and making them the instruments 
of oppression.  In the face of such evil, many people simply give up.  Others manage to 
flee to other countries.  Some hide out in hills and forests, and forge anti-government 
rebel bands.  It may be that there is no power other than armed conflict that will ever 
break ultimate totalitarian control.  Many tyrannies have been overthrown by revolution, 
massive civil unrest or military coups d’ etat.  Tragically, the result of such horribly 
damaging efforts is often the emergence of a new tyranny, no better than the old. 
What is most extraordinary however is not how many people give up, but how 
many people have the courage to battle to reclaim their lives and their countries. And 
times do change; totalitarians and their regimes grow old and die, and younger, and 
hopefully better leaders emerge.  Internal struggles within the ruling clique may weaken 
the regime and make it more vulnerable.  Tyrants and their military backers may fall out.  
Successful counter strokes succeed. Increasingly, the globalized world has learned to 
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apply pressure from the outside that forces changes that could not have been achieved by 
local forces alone.  Occasionally, external invasion threats, support for dissidents, 
economic sanctions, or world-wide criticism force behavioral modifications for the better. 
In other cases, massive social or economic failures become so destructive that even 
tyrants are forced to change their ways.   China now is experiencing all of these 
pressures, and the Communist Party and the operational government has decided to “get 
ahead of the power curve” in the hope that its version of the semi-socialist state will earn 
it the long term support of Chinese citizens.  
In addition, there is another major dilemma in governance:  the laws can be 
written by perverse politicians to make almost anything legal – everything that people 
hate and fear about governments can be and is made mandatory by some law, and its 
enforcement strictly applied.  Every corrupt, unfair, undemocratic, foolish, dictatorial, 
wasteful, anti-social, bigoted, repressive government activity can be made the law of the 
land, and thus make a travesty of the “rule of law”, and turn the supposed protections of 
the law upside down, where they become the enforcers of government destructiveness.  
The author suggests that this may be termed “pathological” governance. 7   In the 
dictionary sense, pathology is defined as “conditions of abnormality and/or deviations 
from what is considered healthy or to be the assumed normal state of things.”  
Pathological means diseased.  When applied to governments, this concept means a 
government that is malfunctioning and abnormal – based on some conception of what is 
healthy and normal.  One of the diseases of pathological government is corruption.  Here 
the test is primarily a legal one:  corruption here is defined as an illegal act in violation of 
duty, induced by improper means.  In government, it involves deriving personal and 
private gain from the exercise of official duty, or acts by others to induce government 
officials to act illegally in violation of duty.  There are many ways to try and control 
corruption -- auditors and inspectors, financial controls, law enforcement, etc., but the 
fact is that few of them seem to work adequately.  Protections are too weak, and motives 
to be corrupt are too strong. Not least of the problems is that most of the protective 
mechanisms are controlled by the very people who have decided to be corrupt.  But even 
if legal corruption could somehow miraculously be eliminated, there would remain an 
extraordinary range of other ways in which governments are pathological.  Any given 
failure of governments may come about from honest error, insufficient understanding or 
mere incompetence, and such failures are not necessarily pathological.  But, in the 
author’s opinion, there are some common elements of governance that appear to 
distinguish pathological behavior: 
1.  If laws are broken by public officials.  This is the acid test for corruption. 
2.  If the intent of a policy or action is pathological; that is, the deliberate sacrifice 
of the general well-being in favor of improper institutional advantage or narrow self-
interest. 
3.  Where, in the face of evidence of failure or impropriety, the leadership chooses 
to ignore the evidence. 
4.  Where the leadership is incapable or unwilling to admit and correct mistakes, 
either to avoid negative political consequences or to conceal incompetence or corruption. 
                                                 
7  Sun, Yan Corruption and Markets in Contemporary China, Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell U. Press, 2004, 
Introduction.  See also Governance in China, op.cit. 
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5.  Where the rule of law is persistently and deliberately ignored, violated, or 
manipulated for perverse motives. 
6.  Where professional knowledge about “how to do it right” exists – but is not 
utilized or where knowledge of best management practices is ignored.  Incompetence by 
individuals may be exhibited but not seen as pathological.  After all, it is human to be a 
little ignorant or indecisive or lazy.  But government institutions should be much closer to 
full competence since they can employ many talents or buy expert assistance. 
7.  If the body of regulations of the government has, either deliberately or 
incompetently become oppressive, excessive and/or unfairly, ineptly or corruptly 
enforced. 
Where totalitarianism is not “total”, there are many ways in which such 
governments can be influenced and their power mitigated such as the following. 
1.  Avoid Centrist Concentrations of Power 
A government which is highly centrist creates so much concentration of power 
that other elements of society cannot defend themselves and maintain their own well 
being.   Governments cannot be trusted to avoid the improper exercise of this power.  The 
whole design of the relationships between governments and the rest of a country’s 
national institutions must be structured to decentralize power within society so that the 
power is shared, and sufficient strength exists outside of the central government to 
modulate centrist power and negotiate and force compromises providing workable power 
balances.  The U. S. constitution is based on this concept of shared power at two levels: 
first as between the central national government vs. the residual powers of the states; and 
second, in a sharing of power between the president, the congress and the courts.  But 
nations need to go farther in sharing of power in two ways: a deliberate sharing of power 
between the government and private interests both individual and commercial; and a 
genuine sharing of government power between the national government and a 
state/province level of government, and also with cities and towns.  Further, the role of 
religious, cultural, social, ethnic institutions which are critical to the well being of the 
public must be kept liberated from political control and intervention and free to evolve as 
determined by their broad public desires. 
2.  Deliberately Work to Create Strong Local Governments 
Governments are broadly either national or local, and there is a world of 
knowledge and experience which supports the premise that the national government 
cannot and should not be the dominant level of government in the definition and delivery 
of local governance.  Citizens will probably always feel that they are weak in dealing 
with the power of their government, but this concern is best addressed by designing a 
“service delivery” kind of government at local levels close to, and directly reachable by 
citizens.  National governments are almost always remote, unreachable, and unrealistic in 
relation to on-the-ground service delivery, and China continues to resist relinquishing real 
political power to local governments even though it has relinquished much economic 
power.  Such remoteness is inherently undemocratic.  In order to create a strong local (i.e. 
state/province level or city level), it is critical to create for local governments the separate 
power to tax.  Local authorities that are forced to rely on the national government for all 
or most of their money inevitably lose any real ability to control or even define the level 
of revenues obtained, and also lose a critical degree of control over how public funds will 
be spent.  Funds are drained off by the national government from local resources, 
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laundered through both the political and bureaucratic mechanisms of centrist authority, 
and then returned to local governments depleted and distorted by national rather than 
local needs and priorities.   
The national government can’t be denied the funds required to meet truly national 
needs, but it should back off from being the sole effective tax collector.  The tax system 
should be deliberately structured to provide a second level of revenue defined, collected 
and spent by local governments.  Local revenues should be adequate to meet their basic 
program operating needs.  There may well be further transfers of funds from the national 
to local governments, but each such transfer should be the subject of continuous 
negotiation between the two levels.  It is critical in such negotiations that local 
governments speak from a position of some power and not total dependency. 
Collateral to this argument is the need for local officials to have their own 
independent power base as defined by law.  This means more than just having local 
officials elected, because such elections can still be over-ridden by centrist laws, 
regulations, and fund controls which can make local officials almost powerless.   
Therefore, in addition to financial liberation, local officials need legal and regulatory 
liberation.  One of the best means of ratifying this local government independence is to 
shift the reality of where citizens go for decisions about important public services and 
controls from the national government to local governments, and then to provide 
deliberate means by which citizens and groups can influence the decisions of these local 
governments, and the quality of public program delivery.  Finally, the managers and 
workers in local governments should be responsible only to their local elected leadership 
including not only the right to hire and fire, but the obligation to develop the government 
workforce up to an adequate level of performance. 
3.  Citizen Self-Sufficiency 
A major lesson that has come out of the socialist experience in governance is that 
governments create a fatal mistake when they persuade the public to rely on governments 
for too many things as a substitute for individual self reliance.  Where citizens are no 
longer able to provide for their own savings, or obtain their own housing, or create their 
own occupations or find their own jobs, or make important decisions in their lives 
without government approval, they have lost a critical element of democratic vigor.  
Inevitably the government that assumes these burdens will be overwhelmed by the 
magnitude of these needs.  People expect, or at least hope for, a lot of things, including 
hope for constant improvement in their lives and those of their children.  No government 
yet has proved capable of being the sole means of meeting such expectations, and they 
should not try.  The more people are able to care for themselves, the better able 
governments will be to successfully perform the roles that the government truly must 
perform.  This view runs directly counter to the philosophies of socialist governance, or 
even the liberal intellectual views which advocate big government.  Whether a 
government is big or not is not critical.  What is critical is whether governments function 
in ways that deteriorate the ability of their citizens to handle their legitimate share of their 
own well being. 
4.  Sharing Power with the Private Sector 
Another failed perception is that of a purist view, most often expressed by 
business leaders that the government should stay entirely out of economic matters.  This 
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is obviously impossible, and it is a view that has faded in the face of a complex modern 
world. 
It is probably self obvious that the government is, and should be, heavily involved 
in matters of the national economy.  What is less obvious is the equally important point 
that the private sector is, and should be, heavily involved in the delivery of critical public 
services.  Here, public services are broadly defined as provision of what citizens need to 
conduct their lives.  As the Soviet government example showed, one can obliterate the 
distinction between public and private sectors-- everything was government.  But the real 
debate is and always has been how any society will allocate the responsibility for public 
services between its public and private sectors, recognizing that there is a very wide 
range of acceptable solutions to these allocation choices.  Take for example the provision 
of higher education.  Some countries create national university systems, with little 
latitude for private universities.  Others rely mostly on private universities, with the 
government concerned with supporting the poor who cannot finance higher education for 
their children.  Most countries seem to be happy with a mix in which a combination of 
both public and private schools emerge in patterns that are more spontaneous than 
planned.  The point is that the private sector has assumed a high degree of responsibility 
for the public service of “higher education.”  Similar patterns of shared responsibility can 
be seen in housing, transportation, food production and distribution, and many others. 
5.  Adequate Public Revenues 
A key lesson is that the question of adequate public revenues is really dominated 
by the question of the adequacy of the economy -- not by the ability of the government to 
tax money out of the economy.  For example, the Soviet Union had almost unlimited 
power and legal  authority to suck money out of the Soviet economy, but it still failed to 
provide adequate public revenues to meet even basic citizen demands.  This is because 
the Soviet economy was neither big enough nor “value added” enough to provide 
adequate funds for many needs, including government needs. 
This reality has dominated the fate of most of the socialist governments that found 
themselves unable to develop their economies enough to sustain their national 
commitments.  The compelling role of governments is to create the conditions within the 
country that will permit the best possible pace of economic growth, and socialist doctrine 
and socialist economic apparatus is crumbling where it is perceived that it does not meet 
this acid test. 
As nations grow more prosperous, the potential for obtaining public revenues is 
enhanced.  But it remains a highly sophisticated task to pull wealth out of the economy 
sufficient to fund the programs of the government without going too far and impairing the 
very economic growth that makes these public revenues possible in the first place. 
6.  Corruption Control 
A deeply disturbing reality all over the world is that government institutions seem 
particularly vulnerable to the problems of corruption, which is not just illegal but 
“immoral” in the sense that it is a violation of the public trust and inherently 
undemocratic.  And there is an even worse dilemma in many governments – some of the 
most vicious and criminal and dysfunctional activities can be made perfectly legal, and 
therefore not “corrupt” in the normal sense.  In China, this issue of corruption has 
become so serious that it is even seen as threatening the acceptability of the current 
political system itself.  For example, one researcher stated:  While corruption was already 
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a major issue in the mid-1990s, by the end of the 1990s, it was unmistakably the most 
prominent sociopolitical issue in China.  In a variety of Chinese surveys – the 
respondents invariably ranked corruption as the most serious issue confronting Chinese 
society.8 
7.  Political Competition 
There are many countries where a reasonably democratic government has existed 
with only one political party dominant over a long period of time, and there are others 
where a large number of parties have not foundered the democratic environment.  But a 
single dominant political party places the country at great risk -- of sinking into forms of 
tyranny both major and petty, or in a loss of competitive vigor in disciplining the 
leadership toward more effective and representative governance.  The existence of such 
supposedly democratic mechanisms as elections, bi-cameral legislatures, separation of 
powers, an independent judiciary, and a free press are not enough to prevent the 
emergence of tyrannical regimes. 
Many developing countries find that there are too few talented leaders in total, 
and far too few who can or will subject themselves to the trauma of politics.  Such 
countries have great difficulty mounting two or more credible political parties at all, 
especially against incumbents who use the government authority to beat back political 
opposition.  A party in power can buy support by dispensing public funds; concealing 
facts from the media and the public; using the police to coerce opposition; and keeping 
cases out of the courts.  It is all too common to see opposition candidates threatened, 
harassed, denied access to the public and the media, or even arrested on questionable and 
largely uninvestigated charges.  Under such conditions, it is understandable that talented 
and decent people are exceedingly reluctant to take on an entrenched regime.  Thus, the 
existence of an effective political opposition must rise up from the whole of society, and 
cannot rely simply on the courage of a few who are willing to make an extraordinary 
commitment.  Good people must be urged to compete, with promises of support and 
protection behind them.  Businesses, courts, bureaucrats and police must try to function 
in the broader interests of the country, rising above the short-term rewards or 
punishments dealt out by those in power. 
8.  Citizen Participation 
This imperative applies even more crucially to the citizens themselves.  There are 
some very stark options facing a national populace.  In the absence of strong 
countervailing means to modulate the excesses of a ruling elite, the public will likely find 
itself robbed, cheated, lied to, and deprived of vital elements of their lives, as victims of 
their own government.  And if such circumstances become unbearable, without a means 
to remove such a government, the only option may become the horrors of a civil 
insurrection of the kind that is now characteristic of the contemporary world.  Considered 
in this light, defending and supporting valid political opposition, whatever the risks, 
seems far the best course.   
This maintenance of political opposition means that citizens have to be 
committed, must watch their government closely to identify its worst excesses, and to 
form themselves into action groups to bring back pressure on the government.  This 
broad counter pressure is needed to defend viability of socially protecting institutions, 
and to expose political corruption.  It must be constant and serious, because centrist 
                                                 
8 Yang., op.cit. 
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regimes, once strongly entrenched, are extraordinarily difficult to dislodge.  It is right and 
important to say that democracy is first and foremost a state of mind, and it must become 
the dominant public morality.  There is hope in the fact that even soldiers and police and 
judges and public officials are both human beings and citizens who can choose to 
function for the public good if pressed to do so by the common judgment of the 
community. 
9.  The Tyranny of Regulation 
One of the most perplexing arenas of governance is that of public regulation, 
which has been a “growth industry” in almost every country.  Regulation can be one of 
the most valuable means by which governments deploy their power, to protect the public 
and to advance the common good.  Almost every country benefits now from proper 
regulation of health protection, public safety, environmental protection, and modulation 
of the functioning of the economy.  But regulation knows few limits; there are almost no 
ground rules to define where regulations exceed reasonable limits and become 
instruments of oppression and petty tyranny.  One of the most important thrusts of 
Chinese administrative reform has been the removal of Administrative Approvals by 
hundreds of government entities at all levels, because they represented a serious 
impediment to the vital policies of economic liberalism, and the encouragement of 
commercial investment and development.9   This type of administrative deregulation, 
driven by economic necessity, is also seen as a prototype for the purging of other forms 
of economic and social overregulation throughout Chinese society. 
10.  Control of the Military 
Throughout history, nations have sought to maintain a strong military, and yet 
keep it within the control of the political leadership -- from pharaohs and kings, to 
presidents and legislatures.  Surprisingly, governments have most often succeeded, and 
this tradition of civilian control is reflected in most governments today. 
But the exceptions to this generalization have been many, and have, over time 
marked some of the worst periods in many national histories.  Often, civilian and military 
leadership have been one and the same.  In other cases, the military has overwhelmed or 
dominated the civilian side of government, most often with dysfunctional consequences.  
Sometimes, the military regards itself as a separate and equal focus of national power, or 
reserves to itself the role of overseers of the country, with some latent responsibility to 
depose what it regards as an unfit civilian government, or to meddle extensively into the 
functioning of the rest of government.  And there is a long and mostly perverse history of 
military leaders using their authority over military units to overthrow the incumbent 
government and establish their own dictatorships. 
Civilian/military relations can also be perverse in the other direction.  Civilian 
governments have often used the military not as the national protector, but as an enforcer 
of their own political control, and as a means to destroy or intimidate political opposition, 
and a means to quash public protest. 
11.  The Opportunities Created by Major Social or Economic Convulsions 
Massive social or economic failures, while tragic, can so discredit a regime that it 
loses much of its power base.  Such failures can also create shifts in alliances for the 
ruling elite, along with splintering, weakening, and even dissolution.  Such failures 
                                                 
9 See Yang, Ibid.  
 
China Struggles to Reform 
 
16    Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies  
increase the likelihood of massive civil unrest on a scale to cause an overthrow of the 
government. 
When an arrogant regime is so embroiled in corruption that it becomes a national 
scandal, this alone may precipitate its own convulsion, and unite many forces in society 
to overturn the regime – by elections if possible, or by civil unrest. 
CONCLUSIONS 
China’s version of the semi-socialist state is one in which the current political 
structure of top-down Party control will remain intact, but the economic structure is 
systematically directed toward a higher degree of market based functioning.  The 
emphasis here is on the retention of political control which is now perceived as not 
requiring absolute ownership.  The top 1,000 SOEs including the four largest commercial 
banks will remain firmly under Party control.  Land ownership remains with the 
government, and its use is largely dictated by government strategies for its allocation.  
Special regulations give the government a grip on the evolution of collectives and 
cooperatives, which are China’s version of small/intermediate sized companies. 
Thus, China intends to remain an authoritarian regime, but a more subtle one, in 
which it retrenches its power and authority to those elements that are crucial to real 
control.  But time is China’s enemy.  The population is aging rapidly and in enormous 
numbers.  All forms of social services are far behind even basic needs in the country, and 
are the source of a growing tide of public outrage.  Social equity is almost completely 
neglected, and freedom of thought or religion or the rights of minorities still tend to be 
viewed as threats to communist/socialist doctrine.   It is not at all clear that the new 
economy will develop fast enough and broadly enough to generate new sources of public 
revenue adequate to upgrade these critical elements of Chinese society.  To return to the 
basic question “Is there some watershed in economic evolution beyond which the 
socialist framework no longer survives?” the answer of Chinese leadership is definitely 
no.  In the broadest terms, it is likely that Chinese citizens see and feel such advances that 
they tend to agree.  Poverty in China has been remarkably reduced, even while there 
remain serious disparities and dysfunctions to deal with.  China’s leadership has 
accomplished so much, and the tides in the economy are so favorable that there is little 
likelihood of some convulsion of such a magnitude that it dislodges the current political 
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